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SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN AND THE 
REASONABLE NECESSITY DOCTRINE IN 
SEVERANCE DEED OWNERSHIP: 
WHITEMAN v. CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA 
KATHRYN SCHERPF* 
Abstract: Horizontal severance deeds separate property rights above and below 
the surface. Sub-surface rights have typically belonged to mineral estate owners, 
whereas surface rights above have typically belonged to farmers. In West Vir-
ginia, courts have traditionally applied a common law trespass doctrine known 
as reasonable necessity to account for times when these bifurcated rights clash. 
The reasonable necessity doctrine in West Virginia has evolved over time as 
state courts have made it more rigorous by requiring that, in exercising their 
rights, sub-surface mineral estate owners not substantially burden the surface. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Whiteman v. 
Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. applies the current standard to resolve disputes 
between the rights of surface and mineral estate owners in horizontal severance 
deed disputes. This Comment argues that the Fourth Circuit properly applied the 
heightened reasonable necessity doctrine that has developed in West Virginia 
common law over the past thirty years, and that in so doing, the court properly 
balanced the values that both mining and farming bring to the national economy. 
INTRODUCTION 
Landowners typically have a right to exclude others from their proper-
ty.1 When, however, one entity—a mineral estate owner—holds title to the 
underground minerals of a property, and another holds title to the surface un-
der which the minerals are located, the mineral estate owner faces a real chal-
lenge in accessing his property.2 Further, the surface owner’s right to exclude 
is also in jeopardy.3 Martin and Lisa Whiteman, who owned surface rights to 
101 acres of land in West Virginia, learned this the hard way.4 
West Virginia common law typically grants use of the surface land to 
mineral estate owners as long as such usage is reasonably necessary to the 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2014–2015. 
 1 See Michelle Andrea Wenzel, The Model Surface Use and Mineral Development Accommo-
dation Act: Easy Easements for Mining Interests, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 607, 609 (1993). 
 2 Id. at 609–10. 
 3 See id. 
 4 See Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. (Whiteman II), 729 F.3d 381, 382, 394 
(4th Cir. 2013). 
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enjoyment of the minerals below and does not cause a substantial burden to 
the surface land.5 This Comment focuses on the method employed by the 
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to address the entitlements a mineral 
estate owner implicitly retains with respect to the surface land when mineral 
ownership is obtained through a horizontal severance deed.6 It argues that in 
Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., although the Whitemans did not 
receive a favorable outcome, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
properly applied the West Virginia common law requirement that the mineral 
estate owner’s use not only be reasonably necessary to its enjoyment of its 
rights, but also that there not be a substantial burden to the surface owner.7 
This heightened concern that mining operations not substantially burden the 
surface property has developed in West Virginia jurisprudence over the past 
thirty years, and supports the inherent policy of balancing the value of sub-
surface mining with that of farming productivity, which is currently on the 
rise.8 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiffs Martin and Lisa Whiteman (the “Whitemans”) own surface 
rights to approximately 101 acres of land in Wetzel County, West Virginia.9 
They purchased this land pursuant to a general warranty deed dated March 2, 
1992.10 Defendant Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. (“Chesapeake”), a subsid-
iary of Chesapeake Energy—the nation’s second largest natural gas produc-
er—is the mineral estate owner beneath plaintiff’s property.11 Each party’s 
property rights originated from two severance deeds that split the surface and 
mineral estates of the relevant 101 acres.12 Both severance deeds allowed 
severance by granting the respective surface estate to the grantee while “re-
serving and excepting” the mineral estate to the grantor.13 
                                                                                                                           
 5 Id. at 390. 
 6 See infra notes 40–80 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 81–127 and accompanying text. 
 8 See Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 390; WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, HIGHLIGHTS 
OF RECENT FARM SECTOR AND RURAL ECONOMY PERFORMANCE 2 (2014), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/ceastatsheetruraleconomy.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/8B6B-7P6W (demonstrating that farming productivity is currently the highest it has been since 
1973). 
 9 Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. (Whiteman I), 873 F. Supp. 2d 767, 770 (D. 
W. Va. 2012), aff’d, 729 F.3d 381 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 10 Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 382–83. 
 11 Meaning Chesapeake owns lease rights to minerals beneath plaintiffs’ surface property. See 
Whiteman I, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 770. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 383. Both deeds explicitly stated, “[t]here is reserved and accepted 
unto the said Ellis O. Miller, the grantor, all of his interest in and to the oil and gas within and under-
lying the above-described parcels as well as all of the coal not heretofore conveyed, and all other 
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The severance deeds neither reserved any specific surface rights for 
Chesapeake, nor mentioned permitting permanent waste disposal from min-
eral extraction.14 The Whitemans owned the entire 101 acres of surface land, 
on which they lived, raised sheep, and performed other farming activities.15 
Notably, they grew hay on the same ten acres under which Chesapeake ob-
tained proper permission from the West Virginia Department of Environmen-
tal Protection (“WVDEP”) to conduct its well operations and dispose of pit 
waste, which included drill water, frac blow back, and various formation cut-
tings.16 To obtain WVDEP permission, Chesapeake followed the WVDEP 
permit process by first notifying the Whitemans of its intent to dispose of 
drill-waste in pits on the property and providing them a copy of its WVDEP 
application.17 On the application, Chesapeake included a list of the substances 
it anticipated the pit waste would contain, including drill water, frac blow-
back, and drill cuttings.18 Once the pit began operating, the Whitemans were 
no longer able to produce hay because Chesapeake’s well operations and drill 
waste disposal destroyed the land.19 
Chesapeake drilled using “mud,” a water-based drilling fluid that re-
moves excess drill cuttings.20 It disposed of the drill cuttings in accordance 
with the intended land application method by depositing them in open pits 
near the wellheads on the Whitemans’ property.21 This pit method is consid-
ered an “open” system, which was common in West Virginia in 2007, despite 
the existence and use of other, less hazardous methods for drill waste disposal 
in other parts of the country.22 One alternative method in particular—the 
“closed-loop” system—entails removing drill cuttings and other waste from 
the well site and placing it in off-site landfills.23 Closed-loop systems create a 
smaller drilling operation footprint, help preserve pricey mud for future drill-
ing operations, and eliminate concerns of on-site disposal pit failure.24 
Closed-loop systems, however, can cost approximately $100,000 more than 
open systems, depending on the well location.25 Although Chesapeake started 
                                                                                                                           
minerals within and underlying the above described property, with the necessary rights and privileges 
appertaining thereto.” Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Whiteman I, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 770. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 383. 
 18 Id. Drill cuttings consist of earth, rock, and other debris released when drilling the wells. Id. 
at 383 n.2. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 383; Whiteman I, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 771. 
 21 Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 384. 
 22 See id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
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using closed-loop systems in several locations in Oklahoma and Texas as ear-
ly as 2004 and 2005, it did not do so in West Virginia until December 2009,26 
approximately two years after it began using waste pits on the Whitemans’ 
land.27 
On February 23, 2011, the Whitemans brought a lawsuit alleging com-
mon law trespass against Chesapeake in the State Circuit Court of Wetzel 
County, West Virginia.28 Upon filing, they admitted that their monetary dam-
ages were “trivial” and, “not real significant.”29 In fact, expert testimony re-
vealed no diminution in value to the Whitemans’ property as a result of the 
drilling operations.30 Nevertheless, they sought to exclude Chesapeake and 
others from their property and argued that Chesapeake was required to re-
move the waste pits to eliminate the possibility that they themselves could be 
held accountable for liability in the future due to them.31 
Chesapeake removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of West Virginia on the basis of diversity of citizenship.32 Thereafter, 
the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.33 In an order dated 
June 11, 2012, the district court denied the Whitemans’ motion and granted 
Chesapeake’s motion with respect to the trespass claim.34 The Whitemans 
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.35 
In Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., the Fourth Circuit re-
viewed the district court’s decision to grant Chesapeake’s motion for sum-
mary judgment on the basis of the district court’s determination that Chesa-
                                                                                                                           
 26 Id. 
 27 See id.; Whiteman I, 873 F. Supp. 2d 767, 775 (D. W. Va. 2012), aff’d, 729 F.3d 381 (4th 
Cir. 2013). 
 28 Whiteman I, 873 F.Supp. 2d at 769. 
 29 Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 384. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 384; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012) (codifying the federal court 
rules for diversity jurisdiction based on citizenship). The Whitemans are domiciled in West Virginia, 
the state of the family’s residency, whereas Chesapeake is incorporated in, and holds its primary 
place of business in, Oklahoma. Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 384. Thus, there was sufficient diversity 
of citizenship to trigger federal diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §1332(a). The district court 
found the amount in controversy requirement met because the cost of the injunction to Chesapeake 
exceeded $75,000. Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 384. The monetary value of an injunction is determined 
by either looking to its worth to the plaintiff or its cost to the defendant. Id. at 384 n.6. Here, the 
Whitemans did not provide the court with evidence of the injunction’s financial worth to them; ac-
cordingly, the court looked to the detrimental value of the injunction to Chesapeake, which was over 
$100,000. See id. 
 33 Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 385. In deciding this case, the district court referred to the following 
areas of West Virginia state common law: trespass, nuisance, strict liability, negligence recklessness 
or gross negligence, and infliction of emotional distress. Id.; see Whiteman I, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 
769. 
 34 Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 385. 
 35 Id. 
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peake’s permanent disposal of drill waste on the Whiteman’s surface property 
was “reasonably necessary” for the extraction of minerals beneath.36 On re-
view, the West Virginia common law of trespass was the only relevant sub-
stantive law for the Fourth Circuit to consider.37 Further, the court was re-
quired to conduct this limited review in a light most favorable to the 
Whitemans, the non-moving party for the underlying summary judgment mo-
tion.38 On September 4, 2014, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s 
finding that Chesapeake’s activity was reasonably necessary, according to 
West Virginia law, and that there was no substantial burden caused to the 
Whiteman’s surface property.39 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In West Virginia, trespass is “entry on another man’s ground without 
lawful authority, and doing some damage, however inconsiderable, to his real 
property.”40 Continuing trespass occurs if one leaves on the land of another, 
with a duty to remove it, “a structure, chattel, or other thing.”41 “Mere tres-
pass to real estate [is] not enjoined when the injury . . . is susceptible of com-
plete pecuniary compensation and for which the injured person has an ade-
quate legal remedy.”42 Regardless, West Virginia state law allows a court, 
acting in equity, to enjoin a party from continuing trespass.43 The state re-
quires that, to find that the law of trespass applies, one must enter the land of 
another, or—as is relevant in Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachian, L.L.C.—
leave something upon the land of another without “lawful authority” to do 
so.44 
A license is the typical method of obtaining lawful authority to enter or 
leave something on another’s land.45 Upon agreement with the licensor, a 
licensee is permitted to commit some act upon the land of the licensor that 
would otherwise be unlawful trespass.46 West Virginia’s common law of tres-
pass, however, grants a mineral estate owner authority to enter upon the land 
of a surface estate owner to extract minerals, without express authority, li-
                                                                                                                           
 36 Id. at 386. 
 37 See id. 
 38 Id. at 385. 
 39 Id. at 394. 
 40 Hark v. Mountain Fork Lumber Co., 34 S.E.2d 348, 352 (W. Va. 1945). 
 41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 160 (1965). 
 42 Wiles v. Wiles, 58 S.E.2d 601, 606 (W. Va. 1950). 
 43 Tate v. United Fuel Gas Co., 71 S.E.2d 65, 69–70 (W. Va. 1952). 
 44 Hark, 34 S.E.2d at 352; see Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachian, L.L.C., 729 F.3d 381, 
386 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 45 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1059 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “license”). 
 46 Id. 
86 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 42:E. Supp. 
cense, or other permission, when it is reasonably necessary to do so.47 The 
concept of reasonable necessity has been interpreted by the West Virginia 
courts to mean that a mineral estate owner enters the surface estate owner’s 
land without lawful authority “only if” doing so “exceed[s] [the mineral es-
tate owner’s] rights . . . thereby invading the rights of the surface estate own-
er.”48 
A New York case heavily influenced the development of this law in 
West Virginia.49 In 1874, in Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Co., a surface 
estate owner in New York sought to enjoin a mineral estate owner from min-
ing below the land.50 The surface estate owner argued that the mineral estate 
owner deposited “ore and rubbish” from mines along the surface land.51 The 
lower court found that although the mineral estate owner had a right to enter 
the surface estate owner’s land to mine, no right existed “to deposit or keep 
upon [the surface estate owner’s] lands any . . . refuse stuff or rubbish.”52 The 
lower court then ordered the mineral estate owner to remove the ore and rub-
bish deposited on the surface, and enjoined the mineral estate owner from 
future waste disposal on the surface land.53 The New York Court of Appeals 
reversed the ruling, explaining that the lower court failed to consider if it 
were “necessary [to deposit mine waste] for the reasonably profitable enjoy-
ment” of the mineral estate owner’s property in the minerals.54 The court’s 
holding—now called the reasonable necessity standard55—explained that a 
grant of minerals beneath a tract of land carries with it a right to use as much 
of the surface as is fairly necessary to recover the mineral estate holder’s 
“reasonably profitable enjoyment” of the minerals.56 The Marvin court fur-
ther explained that it is rarely acceptable to leave such waste on the land, but 
that “necessary” is a fluid concept because “the facts of each case” must de-
termine what is necessary.57 
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in Porter v. Mack Manu-
facturing Co. and Squires v. Lafferty, citing Marvin, adopted the principle that 
mineral estate ownership implies a “right to use the surface in such manner 
and with such means as [is] fairly necessary for the enjoyment” of the mineral 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Co., 55 N.Y. 538, 539–40 (1874). 
 48 See generally Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721, 725 (W. Va. 1980) (setting out 
the doctrine of reasonable necessity in severance deed conflicts for West Virginia common law). 
 49 See Whiteman II, 729 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2013); Marvin, 55 N.Y. at 565. 
 50 55 N.Y. at 539. 
 51 Id. at 540–41. 
 52 Id. at 542–43. 
 53 Id. at 543–44. 
 54 Id. at 565. 
 55 Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 388 n.11. 
 56 See Marvin, 55 N.Y. at 565 (emphasis added). 
 57 Id. at 553. 
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estate.58 In Porter, the mineral estate owner, Porter, sought to mine minerals 
and carry them off using a tram road that he intended to build on the surface 
estate owner’s property.59 When the surface estate owner, Mack Manufactur-
ing, blocked the operation, Porter sought an injunction.60 Similarly, in Squires, 
the mineral estate owner sought to drill test holes and transport machinery 
and personnel over the surface estate owner’s property.61 In response, the sur-
face estate owner locked the access gate to the land and even assaulted the 
mineral estate owner’s employee for forcing passage.62 
In both Porter and Squires, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
ruled that the mineral estate owners’ respective activities were “fairly neces-
sary” to the reasonable enjoyment of the mineral estate.63 Both decisions en-
dorse the concept that, although fact sensitive, a West Virginia mineral estate 
owner has the right to use the surface “in such manner and with such means 
as would be fairly necessary” to enjoy the mineral estate.64 
Several West Virginia cases more factually akin to Whiteman have fol-
lowed Squires and Porter.65 In 1950, in Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., a sur-
face estate owner brought a trespass claim against a mineral estate owner for 
drilling operations that damaged the surface owner’s land.66 The mineral es-
tate owner drilled a gas well near the center of a fifty-acre tract on the surface 
estate owner’s property where the surface owner grew alfalfa, corn, and vege-
tables.67 In addition, the mineral estate owner constructed a road and pipe-
lines to access the well and dug two ditches through this farming area: one to 
carry water and refuse from the gas well and the other to lay a gas pipe to 
operate the gas well.68 The surface estate owner was unable to produce crops 
as a result of the mineral estate owner’s various activities.69 Once the drilling 
operation finished, the mineral estate owner removed one of the gas pipes and 
drained and covered the ditches, but left one gas pipe permanently below the 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Squires v. Lafferty, 121 S.E. 90, 91 (W. Va. 1924); Porter v. Mack Mfg. Co., 64 S.E. 853, 854 
(W. Va. 1909). In both Porter and Squires, West Virginia’s highest court endorsed the finding in 
Marvin, though neither case dealt with trespass specifically. See Squires, 121 S.E. at 91; Porter, 64 
S.E. at 854; Marvin, 55 N.Y. at 565. West Virginia courts use the two phrases, “fairly necessary” 
and “reasonably necessary” interchangeably. Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 388 n.11. 
 59 64 S.E. at 853. 
 60 Id. 
 61 121 S.E. at 90. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 90–91; Porter, 64 S.E. at 854. 
 64 See Squires, 121 S.E. at 91; Porter, 64 S.E. 854. 
 65 See Whiteman II, 729 F.3d 381, 388–89 (4th Cir. 2013); Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 
S.E.2d 721, 722 (W. Va. 1980); Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., 61 S.E.2d 633, 634 (W. Va. 1950). 
 66 61 S.E.2d at 634  
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See id. 
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surface.70 The Adkins court applied the aforementioned reasonable necessity 
standard, and held that the defendant’s acts—constructing a road to bring ma-
chinery to drill, laying a pipe over the surface, and constructing a ditch for 
draining refuse to prevent it from spreading to the plaintiff’s adjacent surface 
land—were neither unnecessary nor unreasonable.71 
In 1980 in Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, the West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals scrutinized the reasonable necessity doctrine.72 In this case, 
like in Squires and Porter, a mineral estate owner sought an injunction 
against the surface owner for interfering with the mineral estate owner’s min-
ing operations.73 The mineral estate owner wanted to construct a power line, 
which was necessary to ventilate a coalmine under the surface estate owner’s 
land.74 The Buffalo Mining court applied a more exacting test than the estab-
lished “reasonable necessity” standard, requiring the sub-surface mineral es-
tate owner seeking to exercise a right implicit in its deed to demonstrate that 
“the right can be exercised without any substantial burden to the surface own-
er.”75 Accordingly, following Buffalo Mining, the reasonable necessity doc-
trine in West Virginia became a two-prong test: first, the proposed activity 
must be reasonably necessary pursuant to Squires and Porter, and second, it 
must not cause a substantial burden to the surface owner.76 
Buffalo Mining made the reasonable necessity standard uniform in its 
application to two different activities.77 First, “where the mineral estate owner 
engages in activity that disturbs, perhaps permanently and negatively, the sur-
face,” and second, “where the mineral estate owner engages in activity that 
‘virtually destroy[s]’ the surface or is otherwise ‘totally incompatible with the 
rights of the surface owner.’”78 The first type of activity is typically allowed if 
such use of the surface is reasonably necessary, as “implicit to a grant of a 
mineral estate because the surface generally incurs no substantial burden.”79 
The second type of activity, however, is typically disallowed because the sur-
face land burden is so substantial, unless an explicit deed provision author-
ized it.80 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Id. 
 71 See id. at 636. 
 72 Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721, 722 (W. Va. 1980). 
 73 See id.; Squires v. Lafferty, 121 S.E. 90, 91 (W. Va. 1924); Porter v. Mack Mfg. Co., 64 S.E. 
853, 854 (W. Va. 1909). 
 74 See Buffalo Mining, 267 S.E.2d at 722. 
 75 Id. at 725–26. 
 76 See id. 
 77 See id. 
 78 Id. at 725. 
 79 Id.; see Whiteman II, 729 F.3d 381, 390 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 80 Buffalo Mining, 267 S.E.2d at 725–26; see Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 390. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Whiteman v. Ches-
apeake Appalachia, L.L.C., upheld the district court’s finding—according to 
the test set out in Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin—that Chesapeake Appala-
chia’s (“Chesapeake” or “defendant”) activity was reasonably necessary and 
that there was no substantial burden caused to the Whiteman’s surface proper-
ty.81 The Fourth Circuit’s holding properly balanced each party’s rights, and 
in so doing, provided increased protection for the farming industry.82 
The court first determined that the Whitemans failed to establish that 
Chesapeake’s activity was not reasonably necessary, because the open pit 
system Chesapeake used was common practice in West Virginia.83 The 
Whitemans argued that Chesapeake’s drill waste disposal was not reasonably 
necessary to operate its wells because an alternative method to disposal, the 
closed-loop system, was available and significantly less intrusive to surface 
owners.84 The court disagreed with the Whitemans’ argument “that reasona-
ble necessity amounts to necessity,” because otherwise, the court held, “the 
modifier reasonable would be meaningless.”85 The court found that during 
the time the open pit system was employed on the Whitemans’ property be-
tween 2007 and 2009, the alternative closed-loop system was not yet em-
ployed anywhere in West Virginia.86 Thus, at the time the pits were drilled on 
the Whitemans’ property, the open pit system was the “common and ordinary 
method of disposal in West Virginia.”87 
The Whitemans argued that the use of the less-intrusive closed-loop drill 
waste disposal method in Texas and Oklahoma “ought to inform whether 
Chesapeake’s drill waste disposal used [in West Virginia] was reasonably nec-
essary.”88 The court, however, found that comparing technology in different 
states was “false equivalency.”89 Accordingly, the court concluded that defin-
ing what is reasonably necessary relies on the facts of each case and is not 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. (Whiteman II), 729 F.3d 381, 393–94 (4th 
Cir. 2013); Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. (Whiteman I), 873 F. Supp. 2d 767, 770 
(D. W. Va. 2012), aff’d, 729 F.3d 381 (4th Cir. 2013); Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 
721, 725–26 (W. Va. 1980). 
 82 See Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 393–94; WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra 
note 8, at 1 (“Rural America contributes to economic growth, a strengthening Middle Class[,] and 
building America’s competitiveness for the future.”). 
 83 See Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 392–93; supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
 84 Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 392; see supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
 85 Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 392 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 392–93. 
 88 Id. at 393 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see Brief of Appellants at 24, 
Whiteman II, 729 F.3d 381 (No. 12-1790) (citing Chesapeake’s use of the closed-loop disposal sys-
tem in Texas as evidence that the company had access to the newer technology). 
 89 See Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 393. 
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dependent on technologies used elsewhere in the country or even necessarily 
in the same state.90 
The Fourth Circuit next concluded that Chesapeake’s drill waste pits did 
not impose a substantial burden on the surface.91 The Whitemans offered no 
evidence to rebut Chesapeake’s expert testimony that the drill waste pits did 
not affect the Whitemans’ property value.92 The only evidence they produced 
to support their argument of a substantial burden to the land was Lisa 
Whiteman’s fear that drill waste pits would cause the family future liability.93 
The Whitemans admitted that the drill waste pits caused only minimal pecu-
niary loss and the potential damage to the land was limited to ten of their 101 
acres.94 Without anything more, the court found that there was no substantial 
burden.95 Thus, because Chesapeake’s actions were reasonably necessary and 
did not create a substantial burden, pursuant to Buffalo Mining, Chesapeake 
obtained an implicit right to use the Whiteman’s surface land to access its 
sub-surface mineral rights.96 
The heightened requirement from Buffalo Mining—that the mineral es-
tate owner not substantially burden the surface owner—has been incorporated 
into West Virginia common law for over thirty years.97 This increased con-
cern for surface rights demonstrates the state’s awareness of the need for 
proper balance between farming and mining.98 The reasonable necessity doc-
trine was first established by a New York state court in 1874.99 Since then, the 
doctrine has served as the foundation for the development of West Virginia’s 
analogous law.100 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals first endorsed 
the standard in 1909, in Porter v. Mack Manufacturing. Co., and again in 
1924, in Squires v. Lafferty.101 Then, in 1950, in Adkins v. United Fuel Gas 
Co., the court demonstrated the doctrine’s application when a surface owner, 
like the Whitemans, brings a cause of action for trespass.102 As the doctrine 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See id. 
 91 Id. at 392. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 See id. at 394; Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721, 725–26 (W. Va. 1980). 
 97 See Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 389; Buffalo Mining, 267 S.E.2d at 725–26. 
 98 See Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 394; Buffalo Mining, 267 S.E.2d at 725–26; William J. Bern-
stein, Of Mines, Forests, and Impatience, EFFICIENT FRONTIER, http://www.efficientfrontier.com/
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has evolved in the state, it has permitted mineral estate owners to enter and 
use surface estates as is reasonably necessary to access and enjoy their miner-
al rights below.103 
It was not until 1980 in Buffalo Mining, however, that the West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals laid out an explicit limitation on just what burden 
a surface owner could be expected to endure.104 The Buffalo Mining court 
incorporated this concern by requiring that there not be a substantial burden 
to the land.105 The two-pronged Buffalo Mining doctrine requiring reasonable 
necessity and prohibiting any substantial burden on the surface estate owner 
has, as seen in Whiteman, forced courts to more fairly weigh the rights of 
both surface and sub-surface mineral estate.106 By accounting for the degree 
of burden to the surface estate, West Virginia common law currently demon-
strates a more holistic approach to resolving ownership rights than it did be-
fore Buffalo Mining.107 
Farming is essential to the economy of the United States.108 It is im-
portant that courts consider—as the Whiteman court did and as the Buffalo 
Mining doctrine requires—the burden that mining operations can have on 
farming and other surface uses when deciding respective rights for surface 
estate and sub-surface mineral estate owners.109 West Virginia’s two-part re-
quirement, as applied in Whiteman, portrays such a balance.110 
The importance of considering surface damage is further supported by 
looking at current national farming statistics.111 Farming activity is currently 
on the rise.112 It is thus all the more important to protect farmers against sub-
stantial burdens to their surface rights when allowing the implicit right to ac-
cess mining operations below.113 If the substantial burden that mining brings 
to the surface is not considered and controlled, then mining operations would 
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have an adverse impact not only on the surface estate owner, but the national 
economy.114 
Moreover, although mining is valuable to the national economy, farming 
has arguably proven to offer a more economically favorable use of land in 
terms of longevity.115 A mine typically produces its highest returns in the first 
few years of operation.116 Production, however, gradually drops to zero over 
time.117 By contrast, a farm “produces a relatively stable output indefinitely 
into the future.”118 Accordingly, the potentially indefinite sustainability of the 
value of farming should be weighed against the terminal value of mining and 
the processes’ byproduct irreparable destruction of potentially valuable farm-
land that it causes.119 By prohibiting irreparable burdens on surface rights, 
even if such burdens are reasonably necessary to access the mines below, 
West Virginia courts have demonstrated a heightened concern for the value of 
a diverse economy, and have thus created a more conducive environment for 
farming.120 
The Whiteman court properly weighed the implicit rights of the mineral 
estate owner against the burden to the surface owner.121 Chesapeake’s mining 
operations damaged only ten of the 101 acres of surface land used by the 
Whitemans to conduct farming operations.122 The family was also unable to 
demonstrate any pecuniary damage as a result of Chesapeake’s implicit right 
to construct waste pits.123 Given the limited surface land damage and relative 
lack of pecuniary loss, the court properly found that Chesapeake’s mining 
operations did not cause a substantial burden to the Whitemans’ surface 
rights.124 By factoring in the degree of damage to the surface land in terms of 
use and financial loss, the West Virginia court provided the Whitemans a fair 
chance at receiving a remedy.125 The two-pronged test applied in Whiteman 
helps protect the farming industry, an essential component of both the state’s 
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and the nation’s economy.126 The Whiteman court’s reasoning highlights the 
importance of balancing the rights of both mineral estate owners and farm-
ers.127 
CONCLUSION 
Severance deeds, which grant bifurcated land rights to owners of the 
surface and of the subterranean minerals, often lead to conflicts due to the 
sub-surface mineral estate holder’s attempts to access and enjoy its rights. 
West Virginia courts, and federal courts applying West Virginia law, have tra-
ditionally resolved such disputes according to the reasonable necessity doc-
trine. By adding as a condition to the reasonable necessity doctrine that there 
not be a substantial burden to the surface, West Virginia courts have demon-
strated a more balanced concern for both mineral and surface rights, and thus 
for mining and farming. 
This balanced approach was seen in Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appala-
chia, L.L.C., where surface estate holders attempted to prevent a mineral 
rights estate holder from digging drilling waste pits on their land. Although 
the Whitemans—the surface estate holder—did not receive a favorable out-
come, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit properly applied the 
heightened West Virginia Buffalo Mining standard, which has now stood for 
over thirty years. This holistic approach to the resolution of severance deed 
property rights is more beneficial to modern farming and allows a properly 
balanced consideration of the values that both mining and farming each bring 
to the national economy. 
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